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From the editors 
 
 
Numerous challenges confront armed forces at present, and in a complex 
world, they need to understand the nature of these challenges.  The challenges are in 
many cases related either to threats emanating from the foreign policy environment 
or to vulnerabilities from the domestic political environment.  The understanding of 
the nature of these threats is a key factor in helping armed forces to organise, equip 
and train themselves in order to deal with these issues.  Most of the debates about 
armed force and the use thereof, thus, focus on understanding what ought to be done 
and how it should be done.  Linking these two questions to the availability of 
resources and the defence budget in particular, is the concentrated essence of 
military science and strategy.  The articles in this edition of Scientia Militaria – 
South African Journal of Military Studies reflect the need for armed forces to 
understand what ought to be done and how it should be done.  In addition, it touches 
on the effect of these two factors on the institutional nature of armed forces. 
The first article by Martijn Kitzen on the ambiguous reality that confronts 
Western-cultured armed forces in the execution of counterinsurgency operations 
highlights both the difficulty armed forces face in understanding the nature of a 
particular threat and the challenge of dealing with it.  In reading the article, one is 
reminded of one the most important ideas of the German military philosopher, Carl 
von Clausewitz.  Clausewitz noted, “… the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching 
act of judgment that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish … 
the kind of war on which they are embarking.”1  The problem for Western-oriented 
armed forces, Kitzen argues, is that even though they may be able to correctly 
identify and even understand the unconventional nature of insurgency, they are 
culturally predispositioned to act in a conventional manner.  Thus, culturally, 
Western armed forces are set to fight small wars badly. 
This cultural predisposition of conventionally minded forces was also 
demonstrated in the conflicts in Rhodesia between 1893 and 1897.  Most of these 
conflicts were of an asymmetrical and unconventional nature – typically small wars.  
In his article, Gustav Hendrich focuses on the uneasy relationships and devastating 
wars between the British colonial government and Matabele and Mashona tribal 
groups and, more specifically, the role of Afrikaner settlers in these wars.  Though 
subjugated to British colonial authority, the Afrikaner minority were regarded by the 
native blacks as collaborators in maintaining white military and political power in 
http://scientiamilitaria.journals.ac.za
 ii 
Rhodesia.  The Afrikander Volunteer Corps was established as a conventional 
military unit to provide the Rhodesian colonial government with additional fighting 
power and to provide substantial support in, at least, two decisive conventionally 
oriented battles. On reflection, Hendrich’s article demonstrates that the linkage 
between culture and asymmetric wars is not new, and that in ever-changing social 
conditions, challenges crop up continuously for those caught up in war.  
 
The article by Evert Jordaan on the development of a special operations 
capability for the South African military is typical of the debate within armed forces 
concerning the capabilities that ought to be developed to deal with small wars.  More 
specifically, most armed forces developed so-called Special Operations Forces to 
help them, firstly, to react quickly in case of an emergency and, secondly, to deal 
with exceptional challenging scenarios that are mostly related to small wars; thus, 
the need for “… highly trained and rapid deployable forces to deal with asymmetric 
threats”.  Jordaan’s argument is rooted, on the one hand, in the need for a balanced 
airborne special operations capability and, on the other hand, the requirement for 
changes in training and doctrine in the establishment of such a capability for the SA 
military. At a time when South Africa is conducting a second defence review 
process, such issues are worth considering. 
 
Using the military in domestic crime prevention operations is closely linked 
to the notion of military success in unconventional operations and the use of special 
operations capabilities.  Crime is a typical internal vulnerability with which states 
have to deal.  Since democratisation in 1994, South Africa has been experiencing 
exceptional high levels of crime, the causes of which are multi-layered and complex.  
How to deal with these high levels of crime have over time developed into a very 
emotive and politically laden question.  The debate on whether the South African 
military should be used in the fight against crime and how it should be used is 
important for both the military and society at large.  In their article, Moses Montesh 
and Vinesh Basdeo reflect on the often-overlooked role of the South African 
military in precipitating and sustaining law enforcement in society. 
 
Of course, deploying the military in these unusual environments necessitates 
a unique kind of leadership from within the military.  More specifically, for the 
military to deploy within their own country and its own people necessitates a strong 
emphasis on character-driven leadership.  This is the kind of leadership model that is 
proposed by Willem Erasmus and Frederick Uys in their article on an alternative 




The character of the soldier – be it in deployment for war or in the complex 
environment of peacemaking – underpins the demands that are placed on military 
leaders in the sustainment of high levels of deployment.  Yet, it is not always a 
guarantee against stress.  The high rate of suicides among soldiers that are deployed 
in Afghanistan and Iraq testifies to this.  In their article, Rene Koopman and Gielie 
van Dyk provide an exposition of the challenge of suicide behaviour that confronts 
many militaries around the world.  The authors emphasise the need for knowledge 
and skills to better understand suicidal behaviour in the South African military.  The 
emphasis in the article is on the nature of the operational environment, high-risk 
factors, and the prevention and proper management of suicide. 
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